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Belgium: Toward a Regionalization
of National Elections?
Régis Dandoy
3.1. Introduction
Regional elections are not a new political phenomenon in Belgium.
This small European country witnessed its first regional elections in
1974, two decades before the transformation of the unitary state into
a federal state. Despite the early introduction of regional elections, the
study of elections at this policy level remains up to now relatively rare.
The exceptions are mainly to be found in the election reports pub-
lished by the journal Regional & Federal Studies (e.g. Versmessen, 1995;
Deschouwer, 2000; Coffé, 2006; Brack and Pilet, 2010). The reasons
for ignorance about the political science literature on this topic are
threefold.
First, between 1974 and 1989, only a very small portion of the Belgian
electorate could actually vote in subnational elections beyond local and
provincial elections. The German-speaking community contains only
0.7 per cent of the total Belgian electorate and is, therefore, politically
not relevant. As a consequence, the elections to the German-speaking
community did not attract much attention from scholars. The federal-
ization of the rest of Belgium is a relatively recent process and, even
though regions and communities were created in 1970 and 1980, and
the Brussels region in 1989, the first direct elections for these entities
occurred as late as 1995 (1989 for Brussels).
Second, decentralization in Belgium was, before 1970, limited to
the provinces (in addition to the local level – the communes). This
subnational territorial organization of Belgium was inherited from the
French and Dutch regimes before Belgian independence in 1830. Most
of the literature on subnational elections dealt with the provincial level.
Provincial elections remained in the shadow of the national elections,
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48 Belgium
and election results were strongly similar. This is due not only to the fact
that provinces have long been perceived as a pure administrative level
(Coninckx and Valcke, 2006, p.59) and not considered by the parties,
the media and the public to be as important as the national institu-
tions (Costard, 1974; Toelen, 1986, p.307; Toelen, 1988, p.99; Coninckx
and Valcke, 2006, p.59; Valcke et al., 2008, p.246) but also because
the provincial elections were organized on the same day as national
elections up to 1991.1
These studies find that provincial turnout equals national turnout
(Costard, 1974, p.548), that the national and provincial vote are by and
large the same (Toelen, 1988, p.113–117), and that the composition of
provincial coalitions mirror that of the coalitions at the national level
(Costard, 1972, p.669; Toelen, 1986, p.321; Coninckx and Valcke, 2006,
p.79). Since the gradual federalization of the Belgian state, provinces
have lost most of their symbolic and political powers, and many polit-
ical actors now question the usefulness and mere existence of the
provincial level.
Third, given its bipolar characteristics, the Belgian political system can
be easily understood via the dynamics between the two main linguistic
communities. Since all of the major political parties from these com-
munities meet and discuss at the federal level, Belgian politics is often
analyzed by observing political events occurring at that level. In this
chapter I discuss the general characteristics of regional and community
institutions and elections in Belgium. Sections 3.3 and 3.4, respec-
tively, analyze congruence between regional and national elections and
explore second-order election effects. I discuss the question of whether
we can observe a regionalization of the vote in Section 3.5. In the final
section I summarize the main findings of this chapter and consider some
additional variables that may contribute to the understanding of the
regionalization of regional and national elections.
3.2. Regional government and regional elections
Compared with that of other European countries, the Belgian political
system displays several particularities. Following the framework out-
lined by Burgess (2006, p.136) for comparing federations, I focus on
two main elements: the institutions and the party system of a federal
country. To this I add the analysis of political cleavages because Belgian
election scholars have indicated the importance of several cleavages in
electoral dynamics (Deschouwer, 1990; De Winter et al., 2006).
The establishment of political cleavages brings us back to the origin
of the Belgian state. When Belgium was created in 1830, its society
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Régis Dandoy 49
was predominantly ruled by a French-speaking elite, even though the
majority of the population was Dutch-speaking. This elite concentrated
the economic, political and cultural powers in its hands. It was only
after decades of repeated claims and political conflicts that the Flemish
movement accomplished the recognition of the Dutch language as an
official language, which meant that Dutch was allowed to be used in
the education system, justice, administration and so forth. However, the
Dutch-speaking movement did not immediately organize itself into a
political party; this happened only in the 1950s with the creation of the
first Flemish nationalist political party.
Although the linguistic cleavage – opposing Dutch- and French-
speakers – is one of the dominant features of today’s political landscape
in Belgium, two other historical cleavages are still important (Lipset
and Rokkan, 1967; Deschouwer, 1990, 2009b; de Coorebyter, 2008).
First, there is the church–state cleavage which opposes catholics vis-
à-vis liberals. The other is the ‘classic’ left–right dimension which
consists of owners of capital competing with workers on socioeconomic
issues.
All together, these three cleavages largely shape Belgian society.
Indeed, the political parties constitute the ‘tip of the iceberg’ of each
cleavage. A series of intermediary organizations (such as labor unions,
newspapers, hospitals, schools, youth movements and mutual insur-
ance companies) are divided according to their cleavage and ‘pillar’,
and they are represented by one of the three traditional parties. These
pillars cover many aspects of the life of each Belgian citizen and are
organized in order to accompany its members ‘from the cradle to
the grave’.
Arend Lijphart understood the importance of the consociational
organization of Belgian society, meaning that each of its segments is
autonomous and enjoys independent decision-making powers within
its sphere of competences. At the same time, these organizations
are forced to collaborate with each other across the pillars. This
consociational system corresponds to a form of ‘functional decentral-
ization’. In other words, each pillar has significant powers in various
policy domains, such as the payment of unemployment allowances
(labor unions) or the refund of health care (mutual insurance compa-
nies). The main decisions of the government are taken in coordination
with the socioeconomic actors of each pillar.
The language cleavage was translated into competition on territorial
decentralization issues in the second half of the twentieth century, and
this cleavage lay at the basis of the gradual transformation of the uni-
tary Belgian state into a federal state composed of relatively autonomous
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50 Belgium
regions and communities. Even if the previous form of decentralization
and state organization into the pillar structure remain significant today,
since the 1960s, the linguistic cleavage progressively began to domi-
nate political contestation. Between 1968 and 1978, the three main
statewide political parties split according to linguistic lines – that is, they
split into separate and completely independent Flemish- and French-
speaking parties (Verleden, 2008). As a result, the linguistic cleavage no
longer opposes regionalist parties to the statewide parties but all parties
tend to compete on language and federalization issues.
The cleavage structure informs to a large extent the elements which
Burgess (2006) proposes to compare federations – that is, the institutions
and party system of Belgium. Since the very beginning of the decentral-
ization process in the 1960s, two diverging opinions have divided the
political actors. In the north of the country, the Flemish actors aim to
defend their culture and language based on a person-based federalism
embodied in the principle of a community, while in the South, the
French-speakers defend their industries and economy, which implies a
territorial principle of federal institutions. These two contrasting visions
of the appropriate base for the organization of Belgium’s federal state –
community or territory – still exist today. Actually, the Belgian compro-
mise consists of the creation of a federation based on two different kinds
of subnational entities.
Belgium is nowadays composed of six territorially overlapping fed-
erated entities: three regions and three communities (article 1 of the
constitution). Belgian federalism is unique not only because it comprises
two different kinds of (competing) subnational entities but also because
the decentralization of competences was carried out gradually via six
successive state reforms. In 1970 both concepts of ‘communities’ and
‘regions’ were introduced into the constitution but only the French-
and Flemish-speaking communities were set up in 1971, followed by
the German-speaking community in 1973. The communities obtained
responsibility for culture, education and language, they were financed
through central government transfers and they were given the revenues
of radio and television taxes. In 1980 the Walloon and Flemish regions
were formally installed. Each federal entity has its own assembly and
executive. At the same time, a special court, called the Court of Arbitra-
tion, was set up to regulate conflict between federal law and regional or
community decrees. Regions received competencies in regional devel-
opment, environmental policy, water policy and infrastructure, while
the competencies of the communities were expanded to include welfare
policy, vocational training and education.
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Régis Dandoy 51
In 1989 the Brussels region and its region-specific institutions, such as
the community commissions in which representatives from the French-
and Dutch-speaking communities meet to decide on Brussels affairs,
were created. In addition, more competencies were delegated to the
communities (education) and to the regions (transport, public works
and financing of local authorities), and a new fiscal system was estab-
lished to finance the entities. Regions obtained authority over eight
regional taxes (e.g. gambling, inheritance and registration fees on prop-
erty transfer) and communities were financed through a tax-sharing
arrangement whereby the central government refunds a proportion of
value-added tax and income tax.
In 1993, Belgium officially became a federal state and the regions
and communities received residual competencies.2 In addition, the
members of almost all regional and community assemblies were now
directly elected. In 1999 and 2001 the regions and communities received
more competencies (mainly agriculture, foreign trade, oversight on local
authorities and development aid), regional taxes were increased from 8
to 12, and the distribution of VAT and income tax to the communities
was based on contributions to the shared tax. These reforms consti-
tuted a fundamental step toward fiscal autonomy for the regions. In the
online appendix of this book, the fiscal figures indicate that most of
the subnational revenue comes from the regions’ own taxes. The latest
state reform was negotiated in 2012 and includes changes which imply
more financial and fiscal autonomy (mainly some liberties in defining
the progressivity of income and taxes) and a further decentralization
of competencies (including health care, employment policy and family
allowances) to the regions and communities.
Overall, the main competencies of the communities are education,
cultural matters and social affairs, while the main ones of the regions are
town and spatial planning, environment, agriculture, housing, public
works, transport, foreign trade, employment policy, organization and
supervision of the local authorities, property belonging to the various
religious groups, and regional aspects of the economic policy, energy
policy, scientific research and international relations.
The Belgian federal system relies on two principles. The first consists
of a loyalty principle (all institutions and norms must remain loyal
to the federation) and the second relies on the absence of hierarchy
between the norms: a federal law has the same value as a regional
or community law (decree or ordinance). Still, responsibility for many
of the policies is shared across government tiers, creating an impor-
tant need for cooperation and agreement between institutions. This
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52 Belgium
has resulted in an increasing number of interministerial conferences
modeled on the German Politikverflechtung and a formal arbitration
system.
One of the outstanding features of the Belgian federation is its degree
of asymmetry. The only commonality between the regions and the
communities is that each of them has a parliament and a govern-
ment. Beyond this, there lies great diversity. The subnational entities
do not enjoy the same legal status and extent of autonomy, and they
are responsible for different sets of competencies. One can even argue
that the Belgian institutional system is fully asymmetrical, meaning
that all subnational entities are unique with regard to their powers and
competencies.
The asymmetry between the entities goes beyond the institutions. For
example, regions and communities are not equal in size. One of them
(Flanders) gathers the majority of the Belgian population3 rendering the
Belgian case even more unique since in no other country in the world
is the (absolute) majority of its population concentrated into a single
region.4
However, regions and communities are also not equal regarding their
constitutional status. The Flemish region and community were merged,
meaning that the Flemish parliament, government and public admin-
istration exercise all the of competencies delegated to both types of
subnational entity. In the south of the country, Wallonia consists of
one region but two communities (the French- and the German-speaking
communities). However, adding to the complexity of the institutional
landscape, a significant number of regional competencies have been
transferred from the Walloon region to the German-speaking com-
munity (monuments and sites, employment policy, police and the
supervision of local authorities) and from the French-speaking com-
munity to the Walloon region (cultural and education matters, sports
infrastructure, tourism, social promotion, health policy, family policy,
social welfare and integration).
Although the Brussels region was constitutionally recognized in 1980,
it was not until 1989, nine years after the two other regions, before it
was established. In addition, the Brussels region faces certain limits on
its autonomy. Similar to the German-speaking community, the Brussels
region does not dispose of a constitutional autonomy. Moreover, due
to its bilingual status, both Dutch- and French-speaking communities
are competent for policy domains pertaining to the Dutch- and French-
speaking populations residing in the Brussels regional territory. These
community policies are coordinated by language-based community
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Régis Dandoy 53
committees and by a joint community committee. The Dutch- and
French-speaking communities delegated some of their competencies
(mainly related to education and culture) to these committees.
In sum, an analysis of subnational elections in Belgium is complex
since they occur in only four of the six subnational entities: the Flemish-
and German-speaking communities and the Walloon and Brussels
regions. The parliament of the French-speaking community is indirectly
elected as it is composed of the French-speaking parliamentarians from
the Walloon region and 19 French-speaking parliamentarians from the
Brussels region, while the parliamentarians elected for the Flemish com-
munity are at the same time representatives of the Flemish region but
the representatives from the Brussels constituency are excluded when
dealing with regional issues.
The second element proposed by Burgess (2006) to analyze federal
countries concerns the party system. Keating (2001) observes that the
Belgian party system presents one typical characteristic when compared
with other federations: there are no federal (or statewide) parties. Since
the split of the three major statewide parties between 1968 and 1978 (the
Christian-democrats, the socialists and the liberals), not one statewide
party managed to win elections and to obtain a majority of seats in
the federal parliament. All of the political parties that were created
after 1978 – the two extreme-right parties (Vlaams Belang (VB) and
Front National (FN)), the two green parties (Groen and Ecolo) and the
two populist parties (Libertair, Direct, Democratisch (LDD) and Parti
Populaire (PP)) – are organized at the community level and explicitly
represent the interests of only part of the Belgian population. Due to the
split of the statewide parties and the creation of new parties in each lin-
guistic community, the Belgian party system is highly fragmented; the
effective number of parties in the federal parliament was 8.42 in 2010
(the effective number of parties is an index that measures the number
of parties existing in a party system and weighted by their size).
It might be better to speak of two party systems rather than of one
party system in Belgium. Even in the bilingual electoral constituency of
Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde, parties are organized and compete along lin-
guistic lines. Few lists provide candidates from both language groups for
the federal elections (House), and bilingual lists are forbidden for the
Brussels regional elections.
Although the regional party systems across the entities contain
different parties, at the party family level we can observe similar
characteristics and structures. For example, each party system was
in 2011 composed of one Christian-democrat (Christen-Democratisch
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54 Belgium
& Vlaams (CD&V) in Flanders and Centre Démocrate Humaniste
(CDH) in French-speaking Belgium), one socialist (Socialistische Partij
Anders (SP.A) and Parti Socialiste (PS)), one liberal (Open Vlaamse
Liberalen en Democraten (Open VLD) and Mouvement Réformateur
(MR)), one regionalist (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) and Fédéralistes
Démocrates Francophones (FDF)), one extreme-right (VB and FN), one
green (Groen and Ecolo) and one populist party (LDD and PP).
In addition, unlike the two other communities, the German-speaking
community does not display a separated (and third) party system. Apart
from the regionalist Pro deutschsprachige Gemeinschaft (ProDG) (and,
to a lesser extent, Vivant), all parties that participate in these regional
elections are subregional branches of French-speaking parties. For exam-
ple, the liberal Partei Fur Freiheit und Fortschritt is officially a member
of the French-speaking MR federation, while the Christian-democrat
Christlich Soziale Partei and the socialist Socialistische Partei are, respec-
tively, branches of the CDH and PS.5 In the analyses presented below,
these parties are considered to be part of their French-speaking sister
parties and are not treated as independent parties.
The similarity of party systems at the party family level is also appar-
ent in the composition of governmental coalitions at the federal level.
As a result of the two quasisymmetrical party systems and due to the
declining but persistent pillarization of the society, parties tend to build
symmetric coalitions – that is, coalitions that gather parties from the
same party families in the federal cabinet (and to a lesser extent in
the bilingual Brussels cabinet). With the exception of the 2007–2011
period,6 the parties belonging to the same party family (Christian-
democrats, socialists, liberals, greens) have always been together in
government or in opposition at the federal level.
Although there are no statewide parties in Belgium (i.e. a party com-
peting in all regions), none of the parties compete in one region only.
In other words, all Flemish- and French-speaking parties – including the
regionalist ones – can be considered multiregional since they compete in
their language-based community (Flanders or Wallonia), which always
includes bilingual Brussels.7
A proportional electoral system is applied to federal, regional and
community elections, and the seat allocation is based on the D’Hondt
formula. Since 2003 (federal elections) and 2004 (regional and com-
munity elections), a threshold of 5 per cent of the votes has been
implemented but it barely had an effect on electoral results and party
strategies (Onclin, Reuchamps, 2011).8 Voting is compulsory for all
elections, including European ones.
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Régis Dandoy 55
Since 1995 all subnational parliaments have been made up of directly
elected MPs for a five-year fixed term with the exception of the French-
speaking community. The parliament of this community is composed of
the directly elected French-speaking members of the Walloon regional
parliament as well as 19 members chosen among the directly elected
French-speaking members of the Brussels regional parliament.
Before 1995 two electoral systems coexisted. For most of the Belgian
territory, a system of ‘double mandate’ was set up, meaning that
national MPs acted at the same time as regional MPs based on a four-year
national term. As a result, between 1971 and 1981 the community par-
liaments (which were called ‘cultural community councils’ at that time)
were composed of all of the national MPs (in both the House and the
Senate) from the same language group, meaning that Flemish national
MPs also had a seat in the Flemish parliament and similarly the French-
speaking national MPs occupied a seat in the parliament of the Walloon
region. Between 1981 and 1995 the community parliaments were com-
posed of all directly elected national MPs from the same language group
(the co-opted senators were excluded). Two subnational entities held
direct regional elections before 1995: the German-speaking community
since 1974 (with a consultative status until 1986), which followed the
four-year term of the national elections, and the Brussels region since
1989, with one six-year term for regional representatives.
Just like the institutional landscape, the Belgian electoral calendar
is rather peculiar. Since 1999 the regional and community elections
have been held on the same day as the European elections (article 117
of the constitution). The first two regional and community elections
occurred simultaneously with the federal elections in 1995 and in 1999.
As a result the country has four completely different election groups
with regard to electoral cycles. The first group contains elections held
between 1986 and 1990 when the elections to the German-speaking
community were held independently. A second group includes elec-
tions from 1974 to 1981 and the 1995 elections, which were held on
the same date as the national ones. In addition, the provincial elec-
tions took place on the same day as the national elections during the
1974–1991 period. A third group of elections – those held in 1989, 2004
and 2009 – were held together with the European elections. Finally, in
1999, subnational elections were held together with the national and
European elections.
In contrast with subnational parliaments in other countries, the
number of MPs does not relate to the size of the entity. For exam-
ple, the Walloon regional parliament is composed of 75 members
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56 Belgium
(i.e. 32,569 voters per MP in 2009) while the Brussels regional parlia-
ment is composed of 89 members (i.e. 6,458 voters per MP). The Flemish
community parliament is composed of 124 members (i.e. 39,631 voters
per MP for the Flemish region (118 members and the Brussels region
(six members)), while the German-speaking community parliament is
composed of 25 members (i.e. 1,898 voters per MP).
In sum, an analysis of Belgian regional elections basically boils down
to an analysis of the elections to four subnational parliaments, which are
the parliaments of the Flemish- and the German-speaking communities
and the Walloon and Brussels regions. Once the French-speaking com-
munity is not taken into account, there is hardly any overlap between
the electorates, the only exceptions being the 53,942 Flemish-speaking
voters in Brussels in 2009 (who voted for both the Brussels regional
and the Flemish community elections)9 and the 47,446 voters in the
German-speaking community in 2009 (who voted in both the Walloon
regional and the German-speaking community elections).
In the analysis presented below, I focus on the elections held since
1995 because before then there were only elections for the German
community (since 1974) and Brussels (since 1989), which can hardly
be considered as representative for Belgium as a whole.
3.3. Congruence of the vote
As explained in Chapter 1, we may differentiate between three opera-
tionalizations of congruence of the vote. Electorate congruence (NN –
NR) compares the national vote at the national level with the national
vote in a particular region. Election congruence (NR –RR) compares
the national vote in particular region with the regional vote for that
region. Finally, party-system congruence (NN–RR) contrasts the vote for
a national election to a particular regional election. Scores on each of
the three indicators are shown in Figure 3.1.
We observe for the Belgian case that the indicator for electorate con-
gruence (NN –NR) remains stable for 15 years (1946–1961). National
elections held in these years demonstrate a strong similarity across ter-
ritories since the observed scores remain around 20 per cent. From 1961
onwards the electoral growth of the regionalist parties in Flanders, and
later in Wallonia and Brussels, led to a gradual increase in dissimilar-
ity. But the turning point was in 1977. Electorate congruence almost
doubles in size and reaches 55 per cent. In three years the Belgian
party system was drastically transformed, due to the split of each of
the three mainstream Belgian parties into two independent parties:
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Figure 3.1 Congruence between the national and the regional vote
Notes: Shown are average dissimilarity scores. See Chapter 1 for the formula. More details can
be found in the Belgian country Excel file.
the Christian-democrats into the Flemish Christelijke Volkspartij and
the French-speaking Parti Social Chrétien; the liberals into the Partij
voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang and the Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès;
and the socialists into the Belgische Socialistische Partij and the Parti
Socialiste Belge. Even if the Christian-democrats split in 1968, the party
mainly presented joint lists until 1974. Together with the successes
of the regionalist parties, this split of the three main Belgian parties
explains most of the increase in dissimilarity between the national and
the regional vote.
If one tracks the scores concerning party-system congruence (NN –
RR), it confirms previous observations about the absence of statewide
parties: the vote for parties is concentrated in particular regions. Look-
ing at the figures by region confirms that the difference between the
national and regional vote is lower for the largest region (Flanders).
Dissimilarity reaches 36 per cent in Flanders but is 47.1 per cent for
the bilingual region of Brussels, where parties from both communities
compete. Figures for the two other subnational entities (Wallonia and
German-speaking community) are more than 60 per cent. When analyz-
ing dissimilarity scores over time, the German-speaking community sees
its score for the NN –RR measure gradually declining from 77 per cent
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58 Belgium
in 1974 to 63.9 per cent for the federal elections of 2010. The scores for
the other regions are fairly stable over time.
The third measurement of congruence of the vote compares differ-
ent types of elections but keeps the electorate constant – that is, the
index compares the vote between the national and the regional election
for the same region (NR –RR). Figures for this index remain relatively
modest, meaning that voters vote for the same parties in national and
regional elections. The average figures per region range from 5 to 10 per
cent. More significantly, the figures are not stable over time. Indeed, the
electoral calendar for regional elections – that is, whether these elections
are organized simultaneously with the national elections or whether
they are held independently – has a significant impact on election con-
gruence. When regional and national elections are held simultaneously,
the index remains less than 5 per cent, while it increases to 11–13
per cent in the case of non-simultaneous elections. Overall, dissimilarity
of the vote in Belgium is mainly to be found in the case of party-system
congruence while election congruence remains low, which means that
voters from a region tend to express the same vote independent of the
type of election (national or regional), while they tend to express a vote
that is different from those of voters in other regions of the country.
3.4. Second-order election effects
The measurement of turnout is crucial when one wants to test the
second-order election model. This model implies that second-order elec-
tions are characterized by lower turnout as well as witness gains for the
opposition, new and small parties but losses for the governing parties.
Since voting is compulsory in Belgium, one does not expect to observe
different turnouts according to the type of election. Figure 3.2 shows
that turnout is very stable not only over time but also across types of
election. In other words, voters do not participate more in national than
in regional elections, and the figures fluctuate between 88 per cent and
94 per cent of electoral participation, with the exception of the federal
elections of 2010 (86 per cent).
Comparing turnout across regions, one does not observe significant
differences with the exception of the Brussels region. Here, regional
turnout is lower for national elections, and both regional and national
turnout is lower than for the other regions. For the period 1987–2010,
turnout for national elections averages 89.8 per cent in Brussels while it
reaches 91.7 per cent in the other three regions. For the period 1995–
2009, the average turnout for Brussels elections drops to 83.2 per cent
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Figure 3.2 Turnout in regional and national elections
Notes: Shown are average turnout rates and their standard deviations per national and
regional election. More details can be found in the Belgian country Excel file.
while it remains high in all of the other regions (91 per cent). The
differentiated turnout for Brussels may be linked to the urban char-
acter of the city region – turnout is proved to be lower in territories
with higher population density (Geys and Heyndel, 2006) – and in the
presence of numerous migrants.
Differences in turnout across time can be related to whether regional
elections were organized simultaneously with national elections, as
happened in 1995 and 1999. More than 3.5 per cent of the Brussels
electorate participated in national elections but not in regional elec-
tions despite the fact that they took place on the same day. However,
these differences are not observed for the other regions. Overall, the
second-order election hypothesis of lower regional turnout is not con-
firmed in the Belgian case taken as a whole, but it might still contribute
to an understanding of the low regional turnout in the Brussels region
although the difference with national turnout is not that significant.
In sum, due to compulsory voting, turnout in regional and national
elections do not differ in Belgium.
Another expectation deriving from the second-order model is that
governing parties should lose vote share in regional elections when com-
pared with the previous national election, whereas opposition, new and
small parties should win vote share (see Chapter 1). Figure 3.3 displays
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Figure 3.3 Change in party vote shares between regional and previous national
elections
Notes: The figure displays changes in total vote share for parties in national government and
opposition. Shown are regional averages and their standard deviations. More details can be
found in the Belgian country Excel file.
vote share changes for parties in national government and opposition
at the time when the regional election was held. In general, government
parties lose vote share while, at the same time, opposition parties barely
increase their vote share, with one exception (in 2003). Overall, vote
share gains or losses are rather modest and never exceed 2 per cent of the
vote. This is probably due to the relative stability alongside the impor-
tant fragmentation of the Belgian party system. An interesting effect
of this behavior is to be found in the absence of dual voting or split-
ticket voting. Voters tend to vote for the same party at the national and
regional level and therefore do not punish national parties in regional
elections.
Interestingly, the decoupling of the electoral calendars of the national
and regional elections, combined with the depillarization of the soci-
ety, produces another effect. Indeed, as indicated by the large standard
deviations, we observe important differences across regions regarding
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the vote shares of governing and opposition parties, and more particu-
larly when compared with the national elections of 2003 and 2007. The
phenomenon of symmetrical coalitions across government tiers is an
important feature of the Belgian political system. This kind of symme-
try has been described by the concepts of ‘double symmetry’ (Dumont
and Dewinter, 1999) or ‘congruent coalitions’ (Roberts, 1989; Swenden,
2002; De Winter et al., 2006; Deschouwer, 2009a), according to which
the composition of the coalitions of the subnational entities replicate
the federal coalition. This practice was particularly well entrenched until
the elections of the federal and subnational assemblies became non-
simultaneous in 2003. Since then the rule of the congruent coalitions
across levels of the state has not always been followed (Dandoy et al.,
2010). In other words, the large standard deviations that we observe
for the years 2003 and 2007 can be explained by the fact that, for the
first time in Belgium, some parties may have been in government at
the regional level while in the opposition at the national level, and
vice versa. The patterns in turnout and vote-share changes for parties
in federal government and the opposition do not indicate that Belgian
regional elections can be conceived as second-order elections. The next
question to ask is whether that means that subnational elections in
Belgium are regionalized.
3.5. Regionalization of the vote
Government congruence scores indicate whether the composition of
the coalition at the national level is congruent with that observed at
the regional level. The results for Belgium indicate that government
congruence is fairly stable over time and across regions and all figures
are to be found between 50 and 58 per cent. These high dissimilar-
ity scores can easily be explained by the fact that the government of
the Flemish community only comprises Flemish parties and that the
Walloon regional cabinet only comprises French-speaking parties, while
the federal cabinet is constitutionally composed of parties from both
linguistic communities.10
Leaving aside the measurements before 1995 that only concern
the Brussels region and the German-speaking community, we also
observe relatively lower dissimilarity scores when regional and national
elections are organized simultaneously (in 1995 and 1999). The fact that
these elections are held on the same day contribute to the installation of
more congruent coalitions – that is, the same parties in the government
at the regional and national levels.
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62 Belgium
As stated above, the Belgian party system is basically composed of two
separate and impervious systems. In today’s Belgium, all parties may be
considered as regional and not one party competes in all four regions.
Non-statewide party strength in regional and national elections since
1978 almost equals 100 per cent. In part, the dual-party system can be
explained by the linguistic cleavage present in Belgian society: political
parties are organized according to linguistic lines which are sustained
and even aggravated by a political debate on the autonomy or even
independence of Flanders.
Another important explanation for the split-party systems concerns
the electoral system. At the federal level, the electoral constituencies
for the elections for the Senate are the three linguistic electoral districts
(Dutch-, French- and German-speaking) while the electoral constituen-
cies for the elections for the House are based on provincial districts. The
only place where Flemish- and French-speaking parties compete with
each other is the electoral district of Brussels and its surroundings (BHV).
However, the recent state reform of 2012 splits the BHV electoral district
into a Brussels district (dominated by the French-speaking parties) and a
Flemish Brabant district (dominated by the Flemish parties), which will
contribute to further separation of the two party systems.
At the regional level the electoral system also reinforces the develop-
ment of two separated party systems. The electoral districts for these
entities cover mostly only unilingual territories, and therefore only
Dutch-, French- and German-speaking parties compete in elections in
Flanders, Wallonia and in the German-speaking community, respec-
tively.11 In the bilingual Brussels region, both Flemish- and French-
speaking parties participate in elections but, as the number of seats for
each linguistic group is fixed in the Brussels regional parliament (17 seats
for the Dutch-speaking parties and 72 for the French-speaking parties),
they do not compete for the same electorate after all.
A final aspect which contributes to the split-party system or, at least,
did not foster the maintenance of a national party system concerns the
federal institutions. In the federal parliament (just as in the Brussels
regional parliament), seats are allocated according to language group
and special legislation, and revision of the constitution needs the sup-
port of a majority in each linguistic group. In addition, parity is the
rule for the composition of the federal cabinet, meaning that each
linguistic group delivers the same number of ministers. A similar rule
applies to the Brussels regional government, where two ministers come
from the Dutch-speaking community and two from the French-speaking
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community. The French-speaking parties usually deliver the minister-
president. In sum, these rules for the composition of federal and regional
governments and parliaments entail that Flemish- and French-speaking
parties in practice do not compete against each other for votes in
elections seats in assemblies or even portfolios in cabinets.
For an answer to the question whether regional elections are
regionalized or not, electoral scores for regionalist parties are of prime
importance (see Chapter 1). The monster success of the Flemish
regionalist party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) in the 2010 national
elections is atypical for the electoral success of regionalist parties in
Belgium since 1945. Basically, each Belgian region has one or two
regionalist parties: the Volskunie (VU)12 and the Vlaams Blok/Belang
(VB)13 in Flanders, the Rassemblement Wallon (RW) in Wallonia,
the Front des Démocrates Francophones (FDF)14 in Brussels and the
Partei der Deutschprachigen Belgier (PDB)/ProDG in the German-
speaking community. These received significant vote shares in the
1960s and 1970s, and they participated in several regional and
national cabinets. In addition, numerous political parties intended to
defend the interests of specific regions as in the case of ProBruxsel
and Rassemblement Wallonie-France (RWF) in the Brussels and Walloon
regions, respectively.
Despite the large number of regionalist and regional parties, and cab-
inet participation of regionalist parties, the representation of territorial
interests is a relatively recent phenomenon. Between 1946 and 1961,
regionalist parties mainly remained as marginal actors in the Belgian
party system. In the 1965 election, the Flemish (VU) and Brussels (FDF)
regionalist parties obtained their first significant electoral successes,
which were soon followed by the Walloon regionalist party (RW) in
1968. The vote shares for regionalist parties increase more or less linearly
with the national election of 1974, when they accounted for 27.1 per
cent of the votes.
The first regional election for the German-speaking community was
held in 1974 and the PDB obtained rather similar results (25.5 per cent).
This party remained the second largest in the region until 1986. How-
ever, the other regionalist parties were not as successful since they
gradually lost most of their vote share after 1974. In 1985 these par-
ties represented only 11.4 per cent of the national vote and their vote
share oscillated around 10 per cent until 2010, mainly due to the per-
formances of the VB. The Walloon regionalist (RW) suffered the largest
number of electoral defeats and basically disappeared in 1985. The
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64 Belgium
two other parties (VU and FDF) had to create electoral alliances with
mainstream parties (the CD&V and the Parti Réformateur Libéral (PRL),
respectively) in order to secure their survival.
Two factors may explain the declining results for regionalist parties.
The first is related to party competition. Not only do regionalist par-
ties face competition from other regionalist parties but the ‘mainstream’
parties emphasize the issue of decentralization in their party manifestos
in a successful attempt to seduce the voter. In Wallonia it was mainly
the PS which won back the support of regionalist party supporters and
in Flanders it was the Christelijke Volkspartij (CVP) in the 1980s and
the liberal VLD and PRL in the 1990s which attracted the voter in
favor of decentralization. The second factor is related to the territo-
rial accommodation of the regionalist demands. The successive state
reforms and steps toward federalization of the country lead to the fulfill-
ment of most of the demands made by the regionalist party (creation of
regions/communities, allocation of competencies and fiscal autonomy,
etc.) diminishing the policy importance of a vote for such parties (De
Winter, 2006; van Haute and Pilet, 2006).
However, some regionalist parties increased in electoral strength
despite the fierce competition of the mainstream parties on the
decentralization issue. For example, the Vlaams Blok/Belang (VB) has
experienced a linear electoral success since 1991. However, one can
easily explain this by arguing that the party took over the votes of
the Volksunie (VU). Indeed, in the 1971–2003 period the combined
vote share of the regionalist parties in Flanders for national elections
remained rather stable. It is only since 2007 that Flemish regionalist par-
ties have seen their aggregated vote share increasing for both regional
and national elections.
Interestingly, the first regional elections in Wallonia and Flanders in
1995 were not rewarded by the voter in the form of electoral success for
the regionalist parties. During the 1995–2009 period, regionalist parties
obtained quite similar vote shares – in other words, regionalist parties do
not perform better in regional elections when compared with national
elections.
3.6. Discussion
Belgium is fascinating for those who want to understand how a coun-
try can move, in a few decades, from a unitary state structure where
national elections are clearly first-order elections to a federal structure
that not only divides the country into regions and communities but
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also produces a regionally divided party system. But for any student of
the Belgian case, the fascination is rapidly replaced by the perplexity
induced by the complexity of the country’s political system.
Indeed, Belgium is the only country in Western Europe where the
subnational level is composed of two types of overlapping entities: the
regions and the communities. These have the same constitutional sta-
tus but nevertheless differ in the extent of autonomy they enjoy, the
competencies they have received and the financial responsibility they
have. In that sense, Belgium is – together with the UK – also the only
country that is fully asymmetrical, meaning that all subnational entities
are unique regarding their power and competencies. This asymmetry is
extended to the electoral process since not all of these entities hold elec-
tions and, for those that do, the observed electoral outcomes are hugely
different.
A quick interpretation of regional election results may be quite mis-
leading. There are two findings which might support a nationalized
interpretation of regional elections. First, the election congruence mea-
surement (NR –RR) demonstrates that voters broadly vote for the same
parties in regional and national elections, even when the elections are
held non-simultaneously. Second, regionalist parties do not perform bet-
ter in regional elections compared with national elections, and they
tend to lose in electoral strength over time.
However, one can barely talk of a nationalization of regional elections.
On the contrary, the high election congruence may equally indicate
that national elections are regionalized. In addition, the losses incurred
by regionalist parties are easily counterbalanced (and even explained)
by the fact that all parties in Belgium have become regional parties.
In today’s Belgium there are no statewide parties which participate
across the whole territory, not even in national elections, and the tra-
ditional political parties – those created at the end of the nineteenth
century – split according to linguistic cleavages. As a result, the party
systems at the national level became completely split into a Flemish-
and a French-speaking party system, which resulted in a party-system
incongruence (NN –NR) of almost 50 per cent of the vote shares.
If one cannot talk about a nationalization of the regional elections,
one can barely speak of second-order election effects in Belgium, even
though Van Aelst and Lefevere argued that in 1995 and 1999, regional
elections had a clear second-order character as they were held con-
currently with the national ones (2012, p.9). With the exception of
Brussels, turnout is not higher for national than for regional elections,
and when governing parties lose in regional elections, those losses tend
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to be limited, and opposition parties also lose vote share. This electoral
behavior can be explained by congruent government coalitions and the
simultaneity of elections.
Going a step further, one can even argue that regional elections in
Belgium are first-order elections and that, instead of a process of nation-
alization of regional elections, we observe a gradual regionalization
of national elections (Deschouwer, 2008). In fact, the regionalization
of national elections in Belgium started long before the introduction of
the first statewide regional elections in 1995. The regionalization basi-
cally started in the 1960s with the establishment of a so-called linguistic
border in 1962–1963, and it was fostered by the change to the electoral
system and by the creation of regional parliaments and communities in
1970 and 1980.
However, federal institutions are not the only factors contribut-
ing to the increasing regionalization of national elections. From the
1960s onward, the Belgian media landscape also became gradually split
between the Flemish- and the French-speaking communities. That pro-
cess did not only involve the press but also radio and TV, including
public television. Nowadays, the Belgian media landscape is completely
split according to the linguistic divide and very few Belgians follow
the media (TV, radio, newspaper) from the other side of the linguistic
border (Sinardet et al., 2004). Political parties communicate with their
voters within the language communities and the split up of the com-
plete Belgian political arena might even result in a further radicalization
of the party system.
The results of the regional elections of 2004 and 2009, which were
held non-simultaneous with national elections, showed that these could
be considered as first-order elections (Van Aelst and Lefevere, 2012). The
organization of the next regional elections in 2014 will be held together
with the national and European elections and this will provide for a
unique opportunity to test – via for example the collection of individual
level data – the rank order of the various elections in Belgium.
Notes
1. From 1995 onward, provincial elections were organized on the same day as
the local elections based on a six-year term.
2. This rule has never been applied. Nowadays, the Federal government
remains responsible for the matters not attributed to the regions and com-
munities and its competences, which are explicitly stated in the special leg-
islation, comprise justice, defence and law and order, social security, foreign
policy, communications, religion and significant parts of the migration
policy.
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3. In addition, Wallonia comprises the majority of the Belgian territory.
4. In comparison, the size of the German-speaking community (about 70,000
inhabitants) is very small.
5. The German-speaking green party (Ecolo) has exactly the same name as the
French-speaking green party.
6. This period witnesses for the first time a non-symmetrical federal cabi-
net since the French-speaking socialist party (PS) joined the cabinet while
the Flemish socialist (SP.A) party remained in opposition. In 2003 another
cabinet was also non-symmetrical for two months when all the French-
speaking green (Ecolo) ministers resigned but the Flemish green party
(Agalev) remained in the government.
7. The Flemish extreme-right party Vlaams Belang presented electoral lists in
the three regions (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) in 2003 and 2007 but its
results in Wallonia were marginal.
8. The exceptions are the representation of the Flemish green (Agalev) and
regionalist (N-VA) parties in 2003 for the federal elections and of the
extreme-right (FN) and regionalist parties (ProBruxsel) in 2009 for the
Brussels regional elections (French-speaking group). For these parties the
introduction of the threshold meant a loss of their seat in those electoral
districts.
9. Estimation based on the number of casted votes, since the absolute number
of Flemish voters in Brussels is not known.
10. Article 99 of the Constitution states that the federal cabinet contains the
same number of Dutch- and French-speaking ministers.
11. In a few instances, French-speaking political parties participate in Flemish
regional elections by creating a joint list and these parties often manage to
obtain one seat. In the Flemish regional assembly, six seats are also allocated
to the Flemish voters living in the Brussels region.
12. The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) – established in 2001 – considers itself
as the heir of the VU (N-VA website: www.n-va.be/over-n-va/geschiedenis
consulted 8 November 2012).
13. Even if the Vlaams Blok/Belang can be primarily considered as an extreme-
right party, an analysis of its party manifesto demonstrates that this party
strongly focuses on decentralization issues (Walgrave and De Swert, 2004).
I therefore include this party in the analysis of regionalist parties.
14. Which name was changed into Fédéralistes Démocrates Francophones in
2010.
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